Abstract: This article argues for a back to basics approach in banking theory and broaden comparative and historical perspectives on bank change. Evidence across advanced economies suggests varieties of finance capitalism rather than convergence toward joint stock banks and capital markets through privatizations, liberalization and deregulation. A minimal definition of banks as deposittaking and loan-making institutions suggests that the US experience remains, paradoxically, both paradigm and exceptional, and that Minskyian approaches both contribute to recent debates about finance and banking and may profit by expanding the scope of analysis to include bank-centered finance abroad.
Introduction
Wray's article "What Do Banks Do? What Should Banks Do?" makes important contributions to the study of banking and finance in the disciplines of accounting, political economy and law. It raises compelling questions about banks and the financial sector to demonstrate, once again, the importance of Hyman Minsky's work for scholarship and public policy (Minsky, 1991; 1964) . Inspired by Wray's article, the extensive scholarship on Minsky (Wray, 2009; Nasica, 2000; Papadimitriou & Wray, 1998; Dymski & Pollin, 1994; Darity, 1992; Fazzari & Papadimitriou, 1992; Crotty, 1990; Taylor and O'Connell, 1985; Flemming, 1982; Goldsmith, 1982) and the pathologies of crisis since 2007, we argue for (1) a back to basics approach in banking theory and regulation, (2) broader comparative and historical perspectives on US banking from a varieties of finance capitalism approach and (3) the need for more common ground between Minsky and mainstream approaches. Minsky's opus supports our claims about the pitfalls of market-based banking (especially in the US), the virtues of traditional depositand loan-based banking and the need to modernize US monetary authorities to avert further crises and the capture of public policy by large banks. The article is organized as follows: After this introduction, Section 2 suggests that a minimal definition of banks and a return to basics in banking theory help separate contested questions of theory, conceptualization and evidence from the core characteristics of banks. A minimal definition strategy averts inserting hypotheses and expectations about market-based banking and deregulation (and a bias toward the US system) into definitions of banking and banking theory. In the third section, we briefly review theoretical positioning of debates about banking and Minsky's financial instability hypothesis since the 2007 financial crisis. Because US banking remains, paradoxically, both an exception and paradigm, care is needed so that Minsky's typology of banks does not conflate experiences abroad with realities in the US.
The fourth section argues that comparative and historical analyses promise to extend the work of Minsky and Wray. Our varieties of finance capitalism approach differs from the widely held expectation among mainstream and critical scholars (albeit less so since crisis) that financial systems would converge toward market-centered paradigms and private banking. The realization of competitive advantages by non-joint stock banks and a back to the future modernization of social banking, especially in bank-centered finance capitalism, are central developments since liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s that have been accelerated by crisis (Mettenheim & Butzbach, 2012; Ayadi, Schmidt, Llewellyn, Arbak, & De Groen, 2010; Ayadi, Schmidt, & Carbò Valerde, 2009) .
Section 5 reviews the implications of these findings and approaches for regulation and monetary authority. A back to basics approach to regulation and broader historical and comparative perspective suggest (1) that deregulation of US banking and purposive weakening of monetary authorities produced and deepened crisis and (2) that the doctrine of "too big to fail," or "globally active systemically important banks" (US Government Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2011, p. 16) led to record capture of public policy by big banks and moral hazard. Moreover, US regulators permitted "stealthlike" transformation of big investment banks into commercial banks amidst crisis -while leaving the bulk of their operations off balance sheets, especially the most questionable credit derivatives. Before concluding, Section 6 argues that Minsky's proposal for community development banks provides a promising reference for debates about post-crisis reforms and paths toward recovery from the damages of deregulation and capture of public policy by big banks.
A minimal definition of banking
Wray uses Minskyian approaches to discuss banking, finance and economics across several levels of analysis. From a micro or firm level of analysis, Wray provides compelling accounts of how banks work. From a mezzo level of analysis, Wray traces the aggregate behavior of (especially big) banks to explain trends in the financial system and draws compelling causal relations between banks, markets and macro phenomena. Sometimes macro explanations are derived from Minsky's model of economic agents based on concepts in banking and finance -a powerful deductive approach tapped by others that should be further explored (Bezemer, 2010; Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 2009 ). Wray also demonstrates how micro-or firm-level phenomena in banking sum to affect the financial system and real economy using more inductive, empirical and conceptual methods of analysis.
However, the breadth of Wray's analysis and Minskyian categories require clarity in defining banks and levels of analysis. The title of Wray's article, "What Do Banks Do?" implies a micro and/or organizational approach. The subtitle "What Should Banks Do?" raises a series of broader questions and begs for clearer specification of how Minskyian approaches transit "up" levels of analysis to the financial system and real economy to address empirical and normative matters. Given this breadth of analysis and variety of questions, a minimal definition (Gerring, 2010, p. 135) of banks is in order to separate core characteristics of banks from essentially contested (Gallie, 1956) claims about their behavior, evolution, performance and systemic effects.
Our minimal definition follows: Banks are institutions that accept money deposits and extend loans. This goes back to classics of banking theory since Macleod (1856) (De Jonghe, 2010) . It does not imply wholesale rejection, or acceptance, of dominant neo-classical and microeconomic approaches to banking (Berger, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2010; Bhattacharya, Boot, & Thakor, 2004) . A minimal definition strategy raises many questions of Wray that go beyond the scope of this article. However, one consequence stands out.
A minimal definition of banks as institutions that accept deposits and make loans places the unique developments of banking in the US in a starkly different light. 1 Most of the research in the US assumes, for better or worse, that traditional banking has been surpassed by other more efficient intermediaries in financial markets (Deeg, 2010) . This, in itself, is a thorny problem. A minimal definition of banks as deposit-taking and loan-making institutions helps (1) separate the diverse phenomena treated by Wray; (2) dramatize how different unregulated market-based banking in the US is in comparative perspective and (3) avert inserting recent trends (especially in the US) into the definition of banking. For example, Wray defines banks, or rather what banks do, as "taking positions by issuing debt." This shifts the focus away from traditional banking and emphasizes how US banks now operate in primary and secondary markets for financial products and services. Many banks do this. However, the traditional, first and core business of banks is that of accepting deposits and making loans. Many histories of banking also get this wrong. For example, Hicks (1969) and Cameron (1972) describe the emergence of merchant banks during the seventeenth century as the transition to modern banking. This conceals the fact that religious orders and charitable institutions founded Monte di Pieta pawn and savings banks in Southern Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Savings banks also emerged throughout Northern Europe in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century (Mura, 2000) . Cooperative banks followed at mid-nineteenth century in response to hunger and economic crisis. Social banking therefore (1) predates modern merchant banking, (2) emerged alongside private banking to retain large market shares in most advanced economies, and (3) has realized competitive advantages since liberalization of the industry (where not privatized or demutualized) (Ayadi et al., 2009 (Ayadi et al., , 2010 .
A minimal definition also counters the tendency of contemporary banking theory to insert ideas about market-based banking into definitions of banks as intermediary institutions (Berger et al., 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2004) . Given the complexity of banking theory, the long history and continued presence of alternative (non-joint stock) banks, and very mixed evidence about market-based banking, a minimal definition helps separates contested matters of theory, concept and evidence from the core business of banks; that of accepting deposits and making loans.
This has three implications. First, regulators should encourage banks to stick to the core business of taking deposits and making loans (Gorton, 2010; De Grauwe, 2010) . The UK Independent Commission on Banking calls this ring fencing -the separation of retail banking from market-based and investment banking (ICB, 2011) . Second, a minimal definition of banking clarifies how exceptional the US transition toward unregulated market-based banking is compared to other advanced (and developing) economies. Third, a minimal definition of banking clarifies the importance of recent evidence that traditional banks outperformed market-based banks in terms of the core functions of finance; efficient and effective resource allocation, informed credit and risk analysis and intertemporal smoothing (Mettenheim & Butzbach, 2012) .
This calls for reconsideration of market-based banking. For example, at the outset of his article, Wray discusses how banks may issue debt to 95% of liabilities -or even hundreds times liabilities in the case of derivatives. Since crisis, big US banks have been capitalized by public and private funds. And the big four US banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup and Goldman Sachs) report capital risk ratings. However, the bulk of derivatives and other financial operations and related exposures remain off balance sheets and off markets (see Appendix 1) . Before crisis, these operations and exposures were excluded from capital risk ratings. US reforms propose to count them in murky, complex and disputed ways.
2 Meanwhile, regulators and bankers in the rest of the world (except for a select number of tax havens and global finance centers) seek to converge toward more conservative Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Capital Reserve Guidelines that require risk weighted capital reserves of 8%, reversing the calculation and ignoring thorny problems of risk weighting. Wray clarifies how leverage and liquidity produced crises in the past, such as the collapse of US savings and loan institutions after they were brought into market-based banking in the 1980s. In this respect, Wray, by focusing on marketbased banking, may actually undermine a traditional solution for what he describes as the liquidity problem; scale, confidence and careful conduct by banks and monetary authorities. From Shonfield (1965) through Aglietta (2009 Aglietta ( , 1995 , the core claim about what makes banking systems stable and effective is that banks with large scale, low leverage and prudent policies can transform a multitude of short-term deposits into long-term finance. This is why going back to basics in banking theory matters. Large scale and low leverage still work. Highly leveraged banks are clearly central to Wray's arguments and behind much of what went wrong after deregulation to cause and deepen crisis in the US and abroad. Given recurrent problems with highly leveraged banks, a minimal definition of banks averts inserting the phenomena into the definition of banking.
3 Theoretical positioning between past and present theories of banking and finance
Wray also distances Minsky's approach from mainstream theory and policy debates unnecessarily. Reconsideration of market-based banking should include works like Adrian and Shin (2010) , Gorton (2010 Gorton ( , 2008 , Akerlof and Shiller (2009) , Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) , Calomiris (2008) , Gale (2007, 2000) , Rajan (2005) , Morris and Shin (2004) , Claessens and Forbes (2001) , Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Tobin (1987) and Fisher (1933) . These works share many features of Minsky's approach -despite fundamental differences about tendencies toward equilibrium or instability. Wray's arguments are also consistent with the views of financial crises in mainstream financial and monetary economics, including classics. For Ricardo and Smith, free efficient markets and a liberal economy and society imply small firms. The concentration of financial transactions off markets and off balance sheets at four US banks and the doctrine of "too big to fail" (or "globally active systemically important banks") are very distant from liberal conceptions of free markets made by dispersed and decentralized entrepreneurs. Wray's criticism on the too big to fail thesis is shared by classic and neo-classical approaches that retain traditional views of banking (Dallas Federal Reserve, 2011; ICBA, 2013) . Market solutions imply the failure of big banks (Calomiris and Mason, 2003) . This may frighten those with geopolitical concerns, vested interests and indeed all of us at the brink of crisis. Nonetheless, this is precisely where theories of moral hazard and objections to government bailouts provide grounds for convergence between Minskyian and mainstream approaches.
Capture of public funds by big banks during financial crises involves long-term trends of lobbying, revolving doors between agencies of monetary authority and big banks, targeted campaign contributions and rare and costly strategic moments of chicken (Rappaport & Chammah, 1966) or brinkmanship (Russell, 1959; Sola & Kugelmas, 2006) . Long before the 2007 crisis, big banks adopted "blood sport" lobbying to control US congressional committees, veto proposals for regulation and promote ideas about self-regulation and the reliability of simple statistical models of risk management (US Government Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010). However, instead of producing greater stability, the deregulation of US banking and finance produced record asset bubbles and wealth effects, freed unethical marketing and predatory sales, and accepted, at face value, the murky bilateral transactions of banks off markets and clearing houses (Gorton, 2010; Baker, 2007) .
Politics clearly matter here, both in explaining the turn to deregulation and the capture of policy amidst crisis by large banks with the "too big to fail" doctrine (Shull, 2010) . The quick pace of events and vast amount of public funds transferred to large banks (over US$16 trillion at US Government Accounting Office 2011 estimates, see Appendix 2) 3 suggest that the concepts developed for past crises in emerging markets may also apply to crisis management in advanced economies. Strategic theories of chicken or brinkmanship suggest that large leveraged banks at the brink of failure may indeed flaunt or encourage perceptions that their failure would deepen panic and produce systemic failure. Brinkmanship was therefore used to describe the strategic positioning of banks, politicians and policy makers during financial crises in emerging markets during the 1980s and 1990s:
Teetering on the brink of crises ("brinkmanship") induces a last minute coordinated response. To avert the worst and to save inherited practices and institutions the relevant actors are driven to engage in "state-crafting". Sola and Kugelmas (2006, p. 6) Understanding how organized interests and big banks may first postpone then capture policies during financial crises implies focusing on politics. A central axiom of political science is that policies determine politics (Pierson, 1993; Lowi, 1972) . More precisely, the type of public policy shapes the form of politics. We return to this promising line of inquiry for analysis of monetary authority below.
Expanding comparisons; varieties of finance capitalism
A comparative perspective also suggests a revision of Minsky's typology of banks. Wray follows Minsky by adopting four categories of banks: traditional commercial banks, investment banks, universal banks and public holding models. This conceals the fact that savings banks, cooperative banks and special purpose (development) banks retain substantial market shares in many advanced and developing countries. Alternative (non-joint stock) banks should not be hidden as a subset of universal banks. A useful expression from studies in Germany is that of "three pillars," where private, commercial and investment banks are one pillar, Sparkasse savings banks are a second pillar and credit cooperatives are a third pillar with roughly equal market shares (Krahnen & Schmidt, 2004) . Our two varieties of finance capitalism provide a more compelling typology. It is based on research in comparative financial economics and political economy that suggests that banks and markets are fundamentally different organizing principles for resource allocation, for channeling household savings to firms, for inter-temporal smoothing of household consumption and corporate investment, and for risk sharing across firms and households. The two types of market-and bank-centered finance capitalism clarify how capital markets, banks and corporate governance vary across advanced economies. On the left side of Table 1 is the paradigmatic market-centered system of the US that retains highly leveraged private banks that compete in liquid markets for capital and deregulated markets for financial services, and where hostile takeovers and liquid equity shares reinforce markets and competition as mechanisms for resource allocation. On the right side is Germany, with shallower capital markets and cooperative, long-term relations between banks and firms at the heart of corporate governance and resource allocation. Allen and Gale (2000) place the UK, Japan and France in between, suggesting that their financial markets, banks and traditions of corporate governance combine attributes more clearly embodied by the polar opposites of the US and Germany.
Descriptive data on the origins of external corporate finance and the structure of domestic banking and finance clarify the two varieties of finance capitalism -market-centered and bank-centered. First, the evolution of corporate finance in the US, Germany and Japan reported by Krahnen and Schmidt (2004) suggests clear and persistent differences (see Table 2 ). In Germany and Japan, banks provided, on average, over 82 and 93% of external corporate finance , while US banks provided 44%. Likewise, US firms obtained 45% of external finance by selling securities, while only 12 and 13% of firms in Germany and Japan obtained such financing.
Change in banking and markets over time confirms fundamental differences between market-and bank-centered varieties of finance capitalism (Deeg, 2011) . Table 3 reports the evolution of bank credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/ GDP, the portion of gross capital formation via equity and the number of listed firms per capita for market-and bank-centered financial systems from 1913 to 1999 (Rajan & Zingales, 2003) . Market-centered finance is characterized by greater capitalization of stock markets (1.52 and 2.25 of 1999 GDP in US and UK vs 1.17, 0.95 and 0.67 GDP in France, Japan and Germany, respectively); less bank credit in the economy (0.17 and 0.39 GDP in the US and UK vs 0.47, 0.53 and 0.35 for France, Japan and Germany, respectively); larger portions of gross capital formation via equity (0.12 and 0.09 in the US and UK vs 0.09, 0.08 and 4. The ideal of frictionless markets is rarely achieved in practice, so (a) "intermediaries" are needed to overcome information barriers and (b) the traditional view of financial markets as ideal means of allocating resources is misplaced (Allen & Gale, 2000, p. 3).
Each of these observations raises complex questions beyond the scope of this article. However, consideration of their implications for Minskyian approaches and the study of banking and finance is in order. , 1970-1996. 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1996 1970-1996 Source: Krahnen and Schmidt (2004, p. 47 ).
The first observation -that stock markets are unimportant in most countries -counters expectations that banking would converge toward joint-stock private banking and market-based intermediation through privatizations, liberalization and deregulation. On the contrary, Allen and Gale conclude that equity markets are rarely at the center of financial systems. 1913-1999. 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 
Back to Basics in Banking Theory
The second observation -that financial markets are primarily markets for government debt -also rings different from recent foci on equity markets, liberalization and privatization. Indeed, in historical perspective, war finance via private sector purchase of government bonds is widely cited as fundamental for the development of capital markets (Geisst, 2012; Dickson, 1967) .
The third observation -that firms obtain finance from markets or bankssupports our varieties of finance capitalism approach. However, this should not conceal the reality that firms tend to use internal resources more than bank credit or stock sales to invest and grow. Since Mayer (1988) , studies of finance call for caution not to overestimate the importance of external funding. From this perspective, market-and bank-centered (and Minskyian) approaches should not overstate the importance of external finance in corporate governance.
The fourth observation of Allen and Gale (that the ideal of frictionless markets is rarely achieved) merits two comments. First, that "intermediaries" are necessary to overcome information barriers reinforces the importance of banks (and our traditional view of them) as institutions for intermediation. Second, this observation is in consistent with the Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. Allen and Gale conclude unequivocally that traditional approaches assuming perfect information, free markets and optimal equilibrium fail to describe how financial systems work. This is another promising bridge between Minskyian and mainstream approaches.
Differences between market-and bank-centered finance capitalism matter. First, bank-centered finance smooths economic shocks better. Inter-temporal smoothing is a core idea in financial economics. Equilibrium and welfare are maximized when adjustment to shocks avert dramatic downturns in the business cycle. Allen and Gale note that the oil price shock of 1973 caused capital in stock markets to decline by half 1972 peaks in the market-centered systems of the US and UK (Allen & Gale, 2000) . This caused severe contraction in household incomes, especially for those holding pensions based on equities. In contrast, because neither households nor pensions held equities in the bankcentered systems of France, Japan and Germany, adjustment to the external shock was realized with substantially lower costs (Hoshi, 2004, p. 210) . Booming domestic equity markets during the 1980s and 1990s shifted judgments in favor of market-centered finance. However, the greater importance of external shocks and the severity of crisis in the 2000s suggest that bank-centered finance capitalism may have once again fared better.
A second difference between market-and bank-centered finance turns on how firms and families renegotiate debt during downturns (Aoki & Dinç, 2000) . In market-centered finance, forces of supply and demand set the price of credit "at-arms-length." In bank-centered finance, credit is determined by "face-to-face" relations and longer views of collaboration. This has significant implications for policy coordination and social and political economy.
Allen and Gale also suggest that market-and bank-centered financial systems are not complementary. Because banks and markets retain different organizing principles, "Competition from financial markets can lead to the unraveling of inter-temporal smoothing provided by long-lived institutions" (Allen & Gale, 2000, p. 156) . If individuals are offered a choice between investments, money may flow out of banks during bull markets to secure higher returns, eroding the capital base and capacity of banks to provide credit and finance. This runs counter to the argument of Hall and Soskice that change may be easier and more advantageous for coordinated (bank-centered) economies that liberalize (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 63) . The contrary may also ensue. During crises, depositors may transfer funds out of markets and private banks to more trusted alternative banks, weakening markets, eroding the countercyclical capacity of private banks and reinforcing the capital and lending capacity of alternative (non-joint stock) banks.
Finally, Allen and Gale calculate better equilibrium across generations in an intermediated (bank-centered) financial system compared to market-based systems. This suggests, in less careful words, that traditional banks and bankcentered finance capitalism are better. Because banks can provide more effective monitoring of firms, finance with longer-term horizons and use information and local knowledge better, it follows that bank-centered finance capitalism may be expected to produce more sustainable growth than market-centered finance capitalism where banks have become intermediaries in capital markets.
Change in market-centered vs bank-centered finance capitalism
In European bank-centered finance capitalism, liberalization, monetary union and competitive pressures from shadow banking and capital markets have not produced systemic convergence toward private banking and market-centered finance. Instead, transition to a single European banking market and regulations induced non-joint stock banks such as savings banks, cooperative banks and public special purpose banks to modernize, merge and further integrate operations while attempting to recast their social missions and policy mandates (Ayadi et al., 2010; Ayadi et al., 2009 ). Liberalization of banking in Europe has thus led to the realization of competitive advantages in all three pillars of banking (Krahnen & Schmidt, 2004; Butzbach, 2006; Carbó Valverde, Gardener, & Williams, 2002) . This is an anomaly for regulators, scholars and bank managers who shared a bias toward market-based banking and expected convergence toward joint-stock paradigms of corporate governance and banking. The place of cooperative banks in market-and bank-centered finance capitalism from 2004 to 2011 illustrates this difference (see Table 4 Critical approaches dating to Hilferding (1910) and Minskyian typologies underestimate the importance of alternative banks. For example, Polanyi (1944) focused on three social reactions of self-defense to laissez faire policies in the nineteenth century (central banking, labor unions and agrarian protectionism), but failed to mention savings trusts and cooperative banks. Regarding Minsky, it is true that alternative banks became increasingly marginal in the US and UK during his lifetime. In the US, the savings and loan crisis reduced the role of these institutions by the early 1990s. In the UK, savings and trust banks were consolidated and demutualized to become joint-stock banks in the 1980s. In this respect, after crisis, regional and local networks of cooperative banks and savings banks abroad provide important references for implementation of Minsky's proposal for US community development banks discussed below (Minsky, Papadimitriou, Phillips, & Wray, 1992) .
In comparative perspective, banks in market-centered finance capitalism (the focus of Minsky and Wray) remain, paradoxically, paradigms and outliers. 4 The 2012 sale by Llyods of 632 branch offices and 4.8 million customer accounts to the co-operative bank has increased the bank deposit market share of cooperative banks to an estimated 7% in the UK.
The US and UK now retain only one banking pillar (private joint-stock commercial banks), while most European banking systems retain two further pillars, i.e. savings banks and cooperative banks, not to mention mortgage banks and government-owned special purpose (development) banks that retain important market shares. Research in Brazil and other developing and emerging economies confirms that alternative banks retain powerful competitive advantages over private and foreign banks and provide important policy alternatives for social and political forces (Jayme & Crocco, 2010; Mettenheim, 2010) . Understanding anomalies of bank change in advanced economies is therefore critical for reassessing change in developing and emerging countries.
Change in market-centered finance capitalism
A historical perspective suggests that market-centered finance capitalism in the US and UK was shaped by politics, early development, liberal philosophies and war finance. The predominance of financial markets and private banking in the US is "largely due to a different political history" (Allen & Gale, 2000, p. 32) . After President Andrew Jackson vetoed renewal of the Second Bank of the US charter in 1832, an "aversion to powerful institutions of any kind" produced repeated bubbles and crises through the nineteenth century (Bodenhorn, 2003) . For Hoffman (2001) , politics and philosophies of public policy periodically reshaped US banking and finance, from delegation of regulation to state governments during the nineteenth century, creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, progressive-era design of savings and loan institutions and credit union and populist movements. Reforms in the wake of the 1907 and 1929 crises ended free banking and left a framework that remained in place until the 1980s. The Federal Reserve System (1913) and Glass Steagall Act (1933) combined deposit insurance, the separation of commercial banking from investment banking and prohibition of cross-state banking. These policies largely ended banking crises and created a more stable system of local and state banks -before deregulation in the 1980s unleashed another round of market bubbles and crises. From this perspective, implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Volker Rule and more restrictive Basel III capital reserve guidelines may provide another turning point in US banking. War finance is another political determinant of market-centered finance. In the UK, government bond markets and creation of the Bank of England are seen to explain both the emergence of British military power and London as a financial center during the eighteenth century (Dickson, 1967) . Historical analyses also cite the Civil War and World War I as primary drivers of financial development and the emergence of New York as a finance center (Geisst, 2012) . The historical development of market-centered finance thus has more to do with politics, war and government bonds than free markets and optimal equilibrium.
A large number of banks was another exceptional feature of the US. Since this was seen to impede competition (Allen & Gale, 2000) , reforms since the 1980s sought to encourage cross-state banking and the formation of larger banks through mergers and acquisitions. The morphing of large US investment banks into commercial banks during the recent crisis culminated consolidation. By 2010, four banks (JP Morgan Chase, Citbank, Bank of America and Wells Fargo) controlled over 45% of total bank assets in the US and (with Goldman Sachs) over 95% of off market derivatives (Appendix 1).
Bank change in the US is also exceptional in terms of the decline of traditional banking (accepting deposits and granting loans). Instead, household savings are invested, through banks and financial institutions, in new products and services based on tradable securities in liquid markets. Table 5 illustrates this shift toward intermediary institutions in the US. Household ownership of corporate equities declined 90.2-37.2% 1950-2010. In contrast, mutual funds increased holdings of US corporate equities 2.0-20.3% 1950-2010, while private pension increased 0. 8-16.8% 1950-1990 (declining to 8.9% in 2010) . Foreign entities also increased holdings of US corporate equities from 2.0 to 12.6% of total 1950-2010, while the value of equities increased from US$140.0 billion to over 23 trillion 1950-2010. The implications of transition from traditional banking to a new financial paradigm in the US have been widely debated. Before the 2007 financial crisis, Hackethal (2001) argued that two interpretations predominated. One suggested that the new financial paradigm signified the end of traditional banking and that new policies of supervision and regulation were required. Another line of research suggested that the end of traditional banking was not foretold and that US banks were well positioned to remain at the center of financial markets, albeit in different ways. In sum, before crisis, consensus existed that a shift away from traditional banking toward a variety of intermediary institutions in liquid financial markets is the core trend in US finance and banking.
Since reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, the UK shares many of these trends. However, traditional institutions in the UK such as insurance companies, pension funds and building societies remain important intermediaries. And UK pension funds and life insurance managers tend to keep out of securities, while commercial paper and money markets remain smaller than in the US. UK banks thus remain important agents for short-term credit to firms, a critical difference during crisis. In a broader sense, traditional institutions repositioned themselves at the center of the new financial paradigm in the UK (Davies, Richardson, Katinaite, & Manning, 2011; Buckle & Thompson, 2005 ).
Wray's article inspires further historical work on change in market-centered finance capitalism. Minsky's historical analysis and typology are important sources for scholars in the wake of the financial crisis. Both the prevalence of crises in US history (before "back to basics" reforms in the 1930s introduced stability) and the deepening of crises since deregulation in the 1980s beg for historical analysis. However, much work is needed. For example, Wray's reference to Minsky's historical categories such as "Banking in the Money Manager Phase of Capitalism" (Wray, 2009) would benefit from review of the rich comparative literature on the 1920s (Feinstein, 1995) .
Change in bank-centered finance capitalism
Debates about bank change in the US and UK turn on how deregulation, financial globalization and new information technologies have deepened capital markets and transformed banking from taking deposits and making loans to market-based management of assets and liabilities. Continental European experiences differed. European banks faced additional pressures from integration, adoption of a single currency and transition to a single banking market. However, increased competition and new bank strategies appear to have reinforced "those fundamental functional principles that are idiosyncratic to the respective financial system" (Hackethal, 2001, p. 32) . Instead of converging toward market-centered systems, finance in Europe has retained traditional features such as universal banks, alternative banks with long-term profit stability orientations and stakeholder governance and a wide variety of national arrangements. This is an apparent anomaly for liberal and neo-classical theories of bank change. Liberalization of banking in Europe has induced alternative banks to modernize, integrate operations and realize competitive advantages (Mettenheim & Butzbach, 2012; Ayadi et al., 2010; Ayadi et al., 2009) .
It is true that most reforms in bank-centered finance capitalism were designed to create large banks capable of competing at home and abroad. The doctrine of "globally active systemically important banks" has reinforced political relations between governments and a select number of very large private banks. However, focusing on big banks conceals the reform, modernization and strategic repositioning of traditional institutions such as savings banks, cooperative credit societies, credit unions, mortgage associations and special purpose banks. Considered individually, most alternative banks and credit institutions are small or mid-sized institutions (that often share wholesale associations to reduce cost and maintain relationship banking networks). However, as a whole, alternative banks sum to a very large part of banking in many advanced economies. And contrary to the expectation that liberalization would reveal the competitive advantages of large private and foreign banks, local and regional credit institutions across Europe appear to have retained significant market shares. The following sections explore bank change in Germany and France to explain these anomalies for neo-liberal policies and contemporary banking theory. 
Germany
Relations between large German banks and business have captured the attention of observers since the nineteenth century (Shonfield, 1965, p. 247; Marshall, 1919, p. 354) . Big private banks are at the center of the most problematic aspects of German history involving late development, authoritarianism, militarism, imperialism, cartels and corporatism. However, in the 1990s, Deeg (1999) noted that private banks accounted for less than 30% of bank assets in Germany. Assets held by the largest five German banks (17%) pale in comparison with the approximately 50% held by the Sparkasse local government savings bank group (including many Landesbanks state government banks). Credit cooperatives hold a further 20% of bank assets and special purpose (development) banks approximately 10%. Shonfield (1965) emphasized business planning, forecasting and long-term relationships with large private firms as the competitive advantages of German banks. Relations between "patient capital" from banks and German industry are defining elements of coordinated political economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001 ). In Germany, banking involves long-term relations and reputations, enduring contracts between suppliers and clients, limited sharing of privileged information, shared technical knowledge and skills, membership in industry associations and regulations that set standards, technologies and vocational training. The German tax system also still limits securities trading while patterns of crossshareholding reinforce cooperation over competition on capital markets.
During the 1990s, German private banks supported financial reforms to improve their international positions (Beyer, 2002) . Political elites also endorsed financial liberalization to project Frankfurt as a global finance center. Reforms dubbed Finanzplatz Deutschland sought to leverage joint-stock banks into global players and secure Frankfurt's future as a world finance center. However, the collapse of capital markets in 2000 and 2008 has led to reassessment of marketcentered strategies and return to traditional patterns of savings, banking and corporate finance. The Frankfurt stock exchange closed the Neuer Markt for high-technology businesses in 2003.
Market downturns in 2000 and 2008 led households to shift assets back to traditional savings institutions (see Table 6 ). From 1999 to 2009, funds flowed out of shares in 9 of 11 years, while holding cash and bank deposits increased during years of crisis. This confirms the observation of Elsas and Krahnen (2003) that traditional relationships between universal banks and domestic A historical perspective helps explain how savings banks and cooperative banks acquired institutional foundations of competitive advantage to reinforce traditional patterns and finance flows in Germany. Politics also explains critical aspects of bank change in Germany. Geopolitical aspirations led to the creation of a select number of large joint-stock banks during the 1890s, institutions that remain the big private banks of Germany today. Commercial banks acquired 31% of bank assets in Germany by 1913, increasing to 40% under hyperinflation in 1925 (Deeg, 1999) . However, by 1929 commercial bank shares of bank assets declined to 33%, reaching 15% under Nazi rule in 1938. Savings banks lost market share 33-19% (1913-1929) but grew thereafter to reach 45% of domestic bank system assets under fascism in 1938. Cooperative banks and local (mostly government) savings banks were founded from the late eighteenth through midnineteenth century to address the social question. However, the Nazi regime centralized the large branch office networks and shared wholesale operations of regional savings banks and cooperative banks in Germany to accelerate industrial development for war.
After World War II, savings banks and cooperative banks in Germany retained large market shares. The balance sheet totals and the value of loans to non-financial firms for different types of banks in Germany 1948-2008 are reported in Figures 1 and 2 . Further time series analysis is in order. However, German banking does not appear to be converging toward market-centered 0.0% 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 3 1 9 8 3 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 8 20.0%
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Private Mortgage & building assoc Public Foreign This anomaly for neo-liberal reforms and contemporary market-based banking theory has implications for social economy and public policy. Savings banks and cooperative banks sustain financial inclusion and avert capital drain from rural areas (Bresler, Größl & Turner, 2007) . Despite liberalization, monetary union and revolutions in information and communication technologies, banking in Germany is still shaped by political and social networks that link public and private sectors, determine the reputations of managers and make or break public and corporate finance. Financial economics calls this relational banking. Comparative political economy calls this coordination. Social economy calls this networking. In Germany, alternative banks retain broad networks of branch offices that place these institutions at the center of social and political economy and sustain competitive advantages. In comparison, private commercial and investment banks suffered losses from exposure in capital markets and scared depositors toward alternative banks. 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 3 1 9 8 3 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 8 
France
This dual trend toward a select number of large private banks and the realization of competitive advantage by alternative banks also appears in France. Large privatized banks such as BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Lyonnais have pursued capitalization on markets and mergers and acquisitions to globalize. In France, big private banks also tend to capture the attention of researchers and regulators. However, the transformation of Caisse d'Epargne regional and provincial government savings banks into an integrated group of cooperative banks and the modernization and integration of other cooperative groups such as the Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, Crédit Coopératif and Banques Populaires suggest that alternative banking in France has also realized competitive advantages since liberalization. However, research also suggests that alternative banks in France adopted market-based banking and paradigms of governance and management from private banks to a greater degree (Butzbach, 2006) .
While large state banks were privatized after 1980 in France, regional and local public savings banks were transformed into cooperatives. In sum, change in bank-centered finance capitalism has differed significantly from expectations of disintermediation and market-based banking. Instead of wholesale privatizations and demutualization, public savings banks and cooperative banks have modernized since liberalization of the industry in Germany and France, using their more traditional banking profiles to avert large losses in the recent financial crisis and to emerge since crisis with substantial market shares. (Hirschman, 1991) . However, it is not rhetoric but reality that Wray captures. Wray identifies a new reality of reaction: the increasing impression of futility among US policy makers in terms of their capacity to supervise, regulate and control banks and financial markets.
Further analysis is required. However, abroad, especially in Europe (and many emerging and developing countries that experienced banking and financial crises in the near past), central banks and monetary authorities have increased capacity to monitor, supervise and regulate domestic banks and capital markets. Meanwhile, transition to BIS Basel Accord III capital risk guidelines is scheduled to impose tougher (more traditional) controls on risk taking and leverage. In comparative perspective, new information and communication technologies have increased the capacity of monetary authorities, especially where crises generated political support for the modernization of bank supervision and market regulation. From this perspective, deregulation of banking in the US has meant lost opportunities to modernize the regulatory agencies responsible for monetary authority (GAO, 2011a).
The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) and the new US Financial Stability Oversight Council may reverse this trend. However, lost opportunities mean lost time. US banking, finance and government during the 2000s strayed from global convergence toward closer monitoring, regulation and supervision of banks and financial institutions under BIS Basel Accords, International Financial Reporting Standards and further European Commission regulation of a single banking market (proposed reforms at the European Commission and European Parliament appear tougher, i.e. more traditional). The technology for more effective regulation of banks exists. Information and communication technologies make it possible for monetary authorities to track bank operations, market transactions and levels of exposure online in real-time. The reality that US regulators lag so far behind other central banks because of Madisonian anti-government utopias, and capture of public policy by big banks, is a luxury neither the country nor world can afford. The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III Accord imply change, but also appear to favor bureaucratic complexity over parsimony and fail to make use of new technologies to increase the efficiency of regulation and reduce costs of compliance for banks. The imposing complexity of new regulations in the US and dispersion of regulation across many agencies and branches of government do not bode well. Moreover, given the continued practice at big banks to retain many assets off balance sheets, transition toward international standards implies a continued double standard (Woolley & Ziegler, 2012) .
Deregulation as the erosion of monetary authority
Perhaps, the most important conclusion from studies of banking crises is that the cost of prevention is much lower than the cost of repair. Supervision of banks and financial markets, tighter regulation of leverage and risk, and timely intervention are much cheaper than capital infusions for banks amidst panic in financial markets, emergency lending of last resport to counter credit crunches and quantitative easing to reverse economic downturns (Sheng, 2011; Tumpel-Gugerell, 2011; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011) . This section reviews how deregulation and market-based banking eroded monetary authority and increased the cost of crisis in the US.
For the US Government Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation's financial markets" (2010, p. xviii).
6 Bank regulation and monetary policy in the US is dispersed across 12 federal agencies, a Federal 6 Dissident members of the Commission note that public housing policies also distorted markets: "US government's housing policies… fostered the development of a massive housing bubble between 1997 and 2007 and the creation of 27 million subprime and Alt-A loans, many of which were ready to default as soon as the housing bubble began to deflate" (2010, p. 533).
Reserve System with 12 independent regional reserve banks, further requirements and institutions on the state level as well as judicial review and legislative prerogatives. The complexity and diversity of bank regulation in the US has burdened banks, produced "regulatory arbitrage" and led banks to shift operations offshore to global finance centers. These were central arguments for deregulation. In 2001, President of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, argued that "market-stabilizing private regulatory forces should gradually displace many cumbersome, increasingly ineffective government structures" (US Commission, 2010, p. 56) . Beginning in the 1980s, deregulation and transition from traditional (deposit-taking, loan-making) banks to market-based banking did indeed replace government structures. However, instead of stability, this produced a wave of bank mergers and failures. In response, US monetary authorities chose to let small banks fail and rescue large banks. President Reagan's Comptroller of the Currency, Todd C. Conover, in testimony to Congress, justified rescue of Continental Illinois (1984, seventh largest US bank) by stating that regulators would not allow large money center banks to fail (leading Representative Stewart McKinney to coin the phrase "too big to fail"). Rescues followed for First Republic (1988 , 14th largest), Mcorp, (1989 and Bank of New England (1991, 33rd largest). In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act sought to limit the use of public funds to rescue failing banks. However, two loopholes proved critical. Regulators could lift caps on rescues if systemic risk was declared to be at stake. And investment banks were to be covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC).
Deregulation of futures markets also led to the explosion of derivatives off bank balance sheets during the 2000s (Appendix 3). Alan Greenspan argued for deregulation in 1999 as follows:
The fact that the OTC markets function quite effectively without the benefits of [CFTC regulation] provides a strong argument for development of a less burdensome regime for exchange-traded financial derivatives. (US Commission, 2010, p. 48) In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act embraced this view and "eliminated oversight by both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)" (US Commission, 2010, p. 48).
The expression "over the counter" (OTC) derivatives (i.e. not traded on exchanges) is widely used. However, two clarifications are in order. First, futures, options and derivatives for commodities, foreign exchange and interest rates have long been purchased by firms to hedge operations and traded on major stock exchanges (Rowady, 2010) . Derivatives help firms transfer risk. And well regulated, transparent and standardized futures markets provide important information that helps ensure that government policy and market forces converge.
In the US, credit derivatives differ because they 1) exploded in value during the years preceding crisis, 2) are traded "bilaterally" as contracts between banks off exchanges, 3) are dominated by four US banks and 4) remain outside banking and capital market regulations. Four US bank holding companies (JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America and Goldman Sachs) reported 96% of nominal values and 86% of "credit risk equivalencies" of off balance sheet derivatives at year-end 2010 (Appendix 1).
In short, the problems with derivatives in the US are not due to derivatives per se but the unregulated explosion of credit derivative contracts during the 2000s that were non-public agreements between banks declared off balance sheets without shared accounting standards or market pricing through clearing houses or capital markets. As former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers testified in 2009: by 2008 our regulatory framework with respect to derivatives was manifestly inadequate" […] "the derivatives that proved to be by far the most serious, those associated with credit default swaps, increased 100 fold between . (US Commission, 2010 This converged with the end of the real estate bubble in the US and (public and private) mismanagement of mortgage-backed securities to produce panic in US financial markets in 2007 (Gorton, 2008) .
Belief in the self-regulation of private banks and the efficiency of markets undermined advocates of intervention and regulation in US monetary authorities. Richard Spillenkothen (Federal Reserve Board Director of Banking Supervision and Regulation, 1991-2006) summarized:
Supervisors understood that forceful and proactive supervision, especially early intervention before management weaknesses were reflected in poor financial performance, might be viewed as i) overly-intrusive, burdensome, and heavy-handed, ii) an undesirable constraint on credit availability, or iii) inconsistent with the Fed's public posture. (US Commission, 2010, p. 54) While demoralization of regulators weakened monetary authority, bureaucracies and budget lines remained in place and failed to reduce the cost of reporting for banks (Rugy & Warren, 2009) .
Our back to basics approach and focus on politics also suggests that biases of market-based banking and capture of regulations by big private banks has also occurred in international institutions (Lall, 2012) . For example, the 1996 revision of the BIS Basel Accord capital at risk guidelines let banks use derivatives to hedge risk and thereby reduce the amount of capital held in reserve. In 1997, International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines recommended that nominal values of derivatives be counted as financial assets on bank balance sheets (IMF, 1997) . Subsequently, the BIS developed (rather complex) guidelines for calculation of credit risk equivalencies for derivatives (BIS, 2010) . International Financial Reporting Standards and domestic accounting boards and associations are currently debating how derivatives should be counted.
From deregulation to crisis
Competing hypotheses have rushed to explain the origin and evolution of the US financial panic and crisis (Lo, 2012; Levine, 2010; Gorton, 2008) . This section briefly reviews antecedents, crisis mechanisms and policy responses. Asset bubbles are not new to financial markets (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011) . However, deregulation, a dual bubble of long-term housing prices and quick valuation of mortgage-backed securities and related derivatives produced unprecedented crisis in 2007. Policy statements, national accounts, Federal Reserve balance sheets, market trends, working papers and the burgeoning literature on the crisis suggest the following causal sequence.
First, the steep valuation of the Case-Schiller Home Price Index from 1988 to 2009 suggests that a long-term asset bubble changed US political economy and produced structural imbalances (see Table 7 ). From 1895 to 1995, home prices largely accompanied inflation (Baker, 2007) . However, from 1995 to June 2006, home prices outpaced inflation by 70%. This produced a US$2.5 trillion home price bubble and US$8.0 trillion in housing-related wealth effects. Construction alone during this period increased from 4 to 6% of US GDP.
Second, policies designed to counter financial crisis in 2000 such as low interest rates fueled another round of home price increases, while construction and consumption were encouraged by further deregulation of financial markets. Revocation of the Glass-Steagall Law (1999), the Commodities and Futures Act of 2000 and the Consolidated Entity Supervision Act of the Securities and Exchange Commission (2004) freed US banks to sell and securitize mortgages (Table 8) .
Third, the valuation of mortgage-backed securities and derivatives created a fundamentally new situation once problems appeared in 2007. Data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) suggest how the value of asset-backed securities exploded after deregulation (Table 9 ). Values of outstanding debt and new debt issued, 1996-2008, reveal an abrupt capitalization of mortgage-related and asset-backed securities. Longstanding markets for Total municipal bonds, treasury bonds, corporate debt, federal agency securities, money markets and asset-backed bonds remained on relatively stable growth trajectories until crisis hit in 2007. In comparison, the market value of mortgagerelated bonds almost doubled from US$3.5 trillion in 2000 to reach US$8.9 trillion before crisis in 2007. Fourth, secondary markets for mortgage-backed securities and derivatives were central drivers of the financial market bubble and crisis. In comparison, municipal bond markets remained largely stable through panic and crisis, despite the subsequent impact of crisis on local government tax receipts and budgets. The value of US Treasury bonds also increased during crisis, reflecting a flight-to-quality, much criticized by surplus countries such as China. This remains a profound comparative advantage of market-centered finance capitalism in the US. Despite originating crisis, flight-to-quality movements in capital markets cheapen counter cyclical policies. Corporate bonds also increased during crisis as US Federal Reserve banks and treasury injected funds to keep US firms afloat. Market-centered finance capitalism thereby retains particular sets of complementarities and policy alternatives.
The increase of home equity loan-based asset-backed securities in 1996-2007 also indicates the distortions in the US economy before crisis (see Table  10 ). The value of home equity loan-based asset-backed securities increased from US$51.6 billion in 1996 to reach over US$585.6 billion in 2007, while "other" asset-backed securities increased from US$76.0 billion in 1996 to over US$1.5 trillion in 2008. Analysis of structural causes, reasons for panic, mechanisms of contagion and consequences for banks, markets, economies and societies will require further research (Lo, 2012) . Financial economists emphasize international capital flows, herd behavior and contagion (Levine, 2010) . Behavioral finance studies suggest that irrational herding and contagion in financial markets require new regulatory approaches (Ackerlof & Schiller, 2009) . Critical perspectives see the current crisis as a historical turning point that has ended the predominance of neoclassical economics, neo-liberal policies and neo-conservative politics (Bresser-Pereira, 2010) . Marxist scholars argue that the fictitious character of financial capital and the fetish of financial markets have produced unprecedented wealth transfers (Crotty, 2011) . A variety of new, neo-and post-Keynsian approaches suggest that Minsky was fundamentally right, but that neo-liberal policies during the 2000s delayed and worsened crisis (Palley, 2010; Laidler, 2010) . We restrict our observations to two comments about central banking and Minsky's proposal of community development banks in the US.
From rules to discretion in market-based central banking
Wray's article also demonstrates that reconsideration of central banking is needed (Jeffers, 2010; Borio & Disyatat, 2010; Buiter, 2008 : Goodhart, 2008 ). Debates about central banking before crisis relegated questions about lender of last resort to the remote past and developing countries where instability persisted. For bankers, regulators, academics and the financial press, new theories about efficient financial markets, new concepts from monetary economics (such as the credit channel and interest rate channel), and technological advances meant that central banking could simply signal markets and manage marginal increments to the money supply to control inflation. Central banking became largely consensual, independent from politics, simpler in the sense of using interest rates to control inflation and more transparent in the sense of looking to futures markets for policy parameters. Crisis profoundly changed all three characteristics. Since 2007, US monetary authorities channeled massive emergency support (US$16 trillion according to US GAO, 2011b, US$29 trillion according to Felkerson, 2011) into a select number of large banks while letting hundreds of regional and local banks and credit institutions fail. The balance sheet of the Federal Reserve Bank increased from US$900 billion before crisis to over three trillion dollars in early 2013, first through massive extension of credit, then through central bank swaps, then through purchase of government bonds. The discretionary character of policies, lack of congressional, judicial and public oversight and a bias toward big banks led to the failure of an unprecedented number of small-and medium-sized banks. Brief review of policies follows to explore the consequences of this dramatic expansion of monetary authority.
In December 2007, the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee authorized Central Bank Liquidity Swaps that reached over US$10 trillion (34% of Felkerson's 2011 total) when ended in February 2010. This implies that the US Federal Reserve Policy served as the primary lender of last resort abroad during the financial crisis (see Table 11 ). Federal Reserve Central Bank (2011) Deregulation and crisis thus required massive ad hoc policies to avert the spread of panic across financial markets and the deterioration of bank portfolios dependent on markets for liability funding. As the US and Europe struggle to emerge from economic downturns caused by crisis, central banking and monetary authority have become profoundly different; politicized rather than independent, involving policies that are complex, untested and often at odds with markets rather than in convergence. Estimates of total transfers by US monetary authorities by the US GAO (16 trillion dollars) and Felkerson (29 trillion dollars) far exceed US GDP of 14.5 trillion at year-end 2010 (GAO, 2011b; Felkerson, 2011) . Central banking and monetary authority have clearly become something different.
Comparing the cost of crisis and asset removal schemes provides further support for our back to basics approach and clarifies the differences across varieties of finance capitalism.
Comparing the cost of crisis and policies in market-and bank-centered finance capitalism
Estimates for the costs incurred from financial crisis produced by the IMF reveal substantial differences between varieties of finance capitalism (see Table 12 ). In terms of economic output lost, the 11 and 23% declines of Germany and France remain below the 25 and 31% declines of the UK and US. The fiscal cost of crisis in Germany and France (1.8 and 1%) also remains substantially below the 8.8
and 4.5% fiscal cost estimates for the UK and US. Lower peaks in non-performing loans (3.7 and 4.0 vs 4.0 and 5.0) and lower increases in public debt from bank recapitalizations (17.8 and 17.3% vs 24.4 and 23.6%) also suggest that the bank-centered finance capitalism in Germany and France incurred lower costs of crisis than market-centered finance capitalism in the UK and US.
Comparison of policy costs also suggests the differences between varieties of finance capitalism. For example, asset removal schemes in the US (US$0.5-1.0 trillion) far outpace similar schemes in Germany (0.18 billion euros) (see Table  13 ). Second, reflecting differences between market-and bank-based finance, assets removed from bank balance sheets were also priced differently -via auction in the US and by auditors in Germany. Third, removed assets are exchanged for cash sold to funds in the US, government guaranteed bonds are Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012) . Output loss = % GDP. Fiscal cost = % GDP of bank recapitalizations (excluding asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from treasury). NPL = non-performing loans as % total loans. Increase in public debt = % increase in debt projections one year before crisis and three years after crisis. issued by Special Purpose Vehicles in Germany to acquire removed assets. Thus, while losses are shared by public (Treasury and FDIC) and private investors in the US, banks are required to declare losses in Germany. Table 14 reports the value of asset removal plans in the US, UK, France and Germany. The descending value of plans designed to inject capital, guarantee liabilities and support assets in the four countries suggest that market-centered finance in the US and UK required more funds from monetary authorities to remove bad assets from bank balance sheets in the wake of crisis. In the US, banks used $216.2 billion of $580.0 billion made available for capital injections, while 33.7 of 55.0 billion pounds and 35.8 billion pounds of additional funds for capital injections were required in the UK. In comparison, 8.3 of 21.0 billion euros in France and 3.2 of 5.0 billion euros in Germany of capital injections, and lower levels of liability guarantees and asset support schemes, sum to suggest the significantly lower cost of crisis in bank-centered finance capitalism in comparison to market-centered finance in the US and UK.
Further comparative analysis is in order. However, estimates for the cost of crisis and asset removal plans suggest that bank-centered finance capitalism fared better than market-centered finance capitalism in the recent crisis. We follow Whitehead (2002) in considering central banking as a mode of political authority. From this perspective, deregulation of banking in the US implies a loss of monetary authority and the destruction of smaller regional and local traditional banks in favor of a select number of banks that continue to declare the bulk of derivatives and other questionable transactions off balance sheets without clearing houses, without standard accounting procedures for risk or value. Instead of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of finance, unregulated banks in market-centered finance capitalism increased capture of public policy and Minsky's proposal (with Wray as co-author) to create community development banks is of the greatest importance (Minsky et al., 1992) . This proposal of Minsky and Wray is innovative because of its focus on the social and economic dimensions of community development. This appears to differ from the insistence of Wray in his present article that banks and finance should contribute (exclusively?) to capital development. His proposal with Minsky for community development banks responds to fundamental problems of credit rationing (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) , emphasizes decentralized relational banking over centralized development banking (Boot, 2000) and is designed to promote socioeconomic inclusion through banking, a question that has regained attention in post-crisis policy debates (FDIC, 2012; Chakrabarti, Erickson, Essene, Galloway, & Olson, 2009) . Given the tendency of centralized development banks and large infrastructure projects to suffer capture from construction industries and labor unions, the proposal of community development banks by Minsky and Wray is far more promising. Community development banks raise profoundly different questions about human capital and social economy, thereby shifting down levels of analysis and away from definitions of capital development that Wray describes as Smithian and Keynesian. This proposal for decentralization, relationship banking and sustainable development through community development banks provides an essential and timely contribution to debates about post-crisis policies in the US and abroad.
7 Credit unions and building societies remain exceptions. In the US, legislation to create a National Infrastructure Bank remains pending in US House and Senate committees, while proposals to create public banks are pending in 20 state legislatures. Small but healthy credit union and independent community bank sectors also suggest diversity in US banking. In the UK, the recovery of non-joint stock building societies, creation of the public UK Green Investment Bank and the expansion of cooperative banking also indicate a resurgence of non-joint stock banking.
Unfortunately, the small size and market-based models of current federal programs for community development finance in the US conspire against the broader social role envisioned by Minsky and Wray. The US Treasury Department Community Development Financial Institutions Fund delegates social banking and finance to an estimated 900 institutions. Although 91.9% of participating institutions are non-profit entities, all banks so registered are for profit institutions (25.6% of institutions are associated with churches). Table 15 reports the number and assets of loan funds, banks, credit unions and venture capital funds that participate in the US Department of Treasury funding. A full 83.1% of outstanding portfolio of these institutions are loans, 13.3% to business, 39.5% to real estate and 4.6% of loans by value to consumers (although 42.3% of number of loans).
Measures of self-sufficiency reported by the US Department of Treasury study suggest the importance of scale to cover costs of operation in social and community banking. In comparison to large and longstanding institutions of alternative banking in Europe, the smaller scale and recent history of many of these institutions reduces their self-sufficiency. Moreover, the concentration of assets in home construction and real estate exposed small US community development finance institutions to large capital losses in the financial crisis.
From the broader comparative perspective of our two varieties of finance capitalism, market-based private banking and a one-pillar banking system in the US mean that social and community development banking must begin on a smaller scale. Review of the Community Reinvestment Act after 30 years confirmed the need for new ideas (Chakrabarti et al., 2009) . US institutions in this sector retain US$5.61 billion assets, a very small portion of the US$11.9 trillion total bank assets reported by the Federal Reserve at year-end 2010. The proposal of Minsky and Wray to create a system of community development banks may therefore inspire more audacious policy alternatives able to accelerate alternative banking experiments. Source: Fabiani and Greer (2007) .
Back to Basics in Banking Theory
Conclusion
We respond to Wray's article on banking by suggesting that a minimal definition of banking, back to basics research strategies and broader comparative and historical perspectives may contribute to the development of his work in the Minskyian tradition. This may also help avert (contrary to the intent of Minsky) that the financial instability hypothesis may actually contribute to the tendency to conflate experiences abroad with excesses of deregulation and highly leveraged banks in the US. For a scholar working in a prosperous financial center of a large developing country that has recently launched new secondary markets for mortgage-backed securities and a variety of other derivatives and financial instruments, Wray's work remains an important reference for how markets, banks and deregulation may go wrong. However, the big stories from outside the US are about the modernization of monetary authorities to better monitor, supervise and control banking, the realization of competitive advantages by alternative banks, the adoption of more transparent and prudent banking in the wake of crises, and insistence on conservative reserve policies to safely deepen credit and capitalize markets. Perhaps, this is the most fundamental difference since the recent crisis. After decades of incremental and often imperceptible progress amidst seemingly endless financial crises and contagion across developing and emerging countries, the pain and suffering of reforms amidst crisis, cautious low-leverage banking and the modernization of central banks appear to have paid off. That US banks, financial markets and monetary authorities have fallen so far behind international standards of transparency, supervision, regulation and reserve requirements are a costly irony and embarrassment that Wray's article helps to address. Total derivatives = Nominal value. Bilateral Netting = "A legally enforceable arrangement between a bank and a counterparty that creates a single legal obligation covering all included individual contracts. This means that a bank's receivable or payable, in the event of the default or insolvency of one of the parties, would be the net sum of all positive and negative fair values of contracts included in the bilateral netting arrangement." (OCC, 2010, p. 12) Bilaterally Netted Capital Exposure = Balance of single counterparty legally enforceable bilateral netting agreement balance between positive and negative values.
Potential Future Exposure = "An estimate of what the current credit exposure (CCE) could be over time, based upon a supervisory formula in the agencies' risk-based capital rules. PFE is generally determined by multiplying the notional amount of the contract by a credit conversion factor that is based upon the underlying market factor (e.g. interest rates, commodity prices, equity prices) and the contract's remaining maturity. However, the risk-based capital rules permit banks to adjust the formulaic PFE measure by the "net to gross ratio," which proxies the risk-reduction benefits attributable to a valid bilateral netting contract. PFE data in this report uses the amounts upon which banks hold riskbased capital." (OCC, 2010, p. 7) Total Credit Derivative Exposure = "Sum of netted current credit exposure and predicted future exposure. OCC explanation: For a portfolio of contracts with a single counterparty where the bank has a legally enforceable bilateral netting agreement, contracts with negative values may be used to offset contracts with positive values. This process generates a "net" current credit exposure… A bank's net current credit exposure across all counterparties will therefore be the sum of the gross positive fair values for counterparties without legally certain bilateral netting arrangements (this may be due to the use of nonstandardized documentation or jurisdiction considerations) and the bilaterally netted current credit exposure for counterparties with legal certainty regarding the enforceability of netting agreements." (OCC, 2010, p. 7) Total Credit Exposure to Capital = Ratio of total credit risk exposure to BIS Basel II Accord risk-based capital (tier one plus tier two capital).
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